Italian divisions in N.Africa
The Italian presence in North Africa is often overshadowed by the German arrival, yet the early campaigns and the long desert war cannot really be understood without looking closely at the two best Italian armoured formations: Divisione Corazzata Ariete and Divisione Motorizzata/Corazzata Littorio. These units were Italy’s main attempt to create modern, mobile forces capable of operating in the vast desert spaces, and although their equipment was mixed and sometimes underpowered, their performance was frequently much better than the traditional narrative suggests.
Ariete, formed in 1939, was Italy’s first true armoured division. When it deployed to Libya in early 1941, it was placed under the overall command structure of the Italian Tenth Army, and later, once Rommel arrived, it fell under Panzergruppe Afrika and subsequently Deutsches Afrika Korps command arrangements. Its divisional commanders during the crucial desert fighting included General Ettore Baldassarre and later General Francesco Arena. Ariete entered the desert war with roughly 7,000–8,000 men, although this number fluctuated depending on losses and reinforcements. Its principal armoured strength early on consisted of the M13/40 and later the M14/41 medium tanks. These were not world-class machines—slow, with unreliable engines and rather thin armour—but in the hands of crews who had trained extensively on them, they were used more aggressively than many expect. Ariete also fielded Semovente 75/18 assault guns later in the war, which proved surprisingly effective because their low profile and effective gun gave them an edge when used defensively.
Littorio followed a somewhat different path. Originally created as a motorised division with strong political overtones—its name taken from Fascist symbolism—it was transformed into an armoured division and sent to North Africa in early 1942. Its commanders included General Giuseppe De Stefanis and later General Gervasio Bitossi. Littorio typically had around 7,500–9,000 men, though like most desert formations it rarely operated at its theoretical strength. Its tank units were equipped largely with M13/40 and M14/41 tanks, later supplemented by Semovente 75/18 vehicles. While it was not considered as cohesive or seasoned as Ariete, it grew more capable through the long mobile battles of 1942 as it learned desert warfare through hard experience.
One of the interesting realities about both divisions is how often their German counterparts noted their persistence and willingness to stand and fight even when their tanks and anti-tank guns were technically inferior. German reports after battles such as Bir el Gubi, Gazala, and the early stages of the El Alamein fighting frequently mention that Italian crews held their positions with determination, sometimes continuing to fire from knocked-out tanks or refusing to withdraw until ordered. At Bir el Gubi in November 1941, Ariete famously halted the advance of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade, a rare moment in the desert war where an Italian formation decisively beat a largely British tank force in open battle. This was due partly to good defensive preparation and partly to the tactical skill of Ariete’s gunners.
There were also smaller but telling details: Italian tanks, though mechanically limited, often had crews who carried extra water, spare parts, and improvised armour made from sandbags or track links. Semovente crews in particular became known for ambushing British armour at close range, where the gun’s performance mattered more than armour thickness. Littorio, though arriving later, gained respect for its stubborn rearguard actions during the long withdrawal after the Second Battle of El Alamein.
Despite all this, both divisions suffered heavily from shortages—fuel, ammunition, recovery vehicles, and reliable radios were all in short supply. Coordination with German units was sometimes excellent and sometimes fraught, depending largely on the personalities of the officers involved. By the final stages of the Tunisian campaign, both divisions had been worn down to fragments and were ultimately destroyed in the fighting around Medenine and later during the Axis collapse in Tunisia.
Yet even in destruction, their reputation among those who fought alongside them was generally positive. They were recognised within the Axis command as the best Italian armoured units deployed in Africa, and many Allied accounts written after the war acknowledged their moments of genuine effectiveness, especially when operating defensively or when supported by German anti-tank assets.
The story of Ariete and Littorio is ultimately one of soldiers performing as well as their circumstances and equipment allowed, often better than many histories give them credit for. In the sifting winds of the desert war, they proved on more than one occasion that courage, training, and a determined defensive line could allow even an under-equipped formation to make its mark on one of the most demanding battlefields of the Second World War.
