Ha-Go Type 95 Tank
The Japanese Type 95 light tank was one of the most widely used armoured vehicles of the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second World War and became a familiar sight across the Pacific and Asian battlefields. Its development began in the early 1930s when Japanese planners concluded that they needed a fast, reliable vehicle capable of operating over long distances in China and other regions with poor roads and limited infrastructure. The emphasis was placed on mobility, mechanical reliability, and ease of transport rather than heavy armour or powerful weapons.
Design work was led primarily by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in cooperation with the Imperial Japanese Army Technical Bureau. Mitsubishi was also the main manufacturer, though production was shared among several companies and arsenals, including Sagami Army Arsenal, Niigata Engineering, and Kobe Seikōsho. The tank was accepted into service in 1935, which gave rise to its Type 95 designation, and it quickly replaced earlier Japanese light tanks that had proven unsatisfactory.
Approximately 2,300 to 2,400 examples were built between 1935 and 1943, making it the most numerous Japanese tank of the war. It was intended for infantry support, reconnaissance duties, and exploitation of breakthroughs rather than direct combat with enemy armour. Its compact size and light construction reflected Japanese doctrine and the logistical challenges of operating across islands, jungles, and undeveloped terrain.
The vehicle was operated by a crew of three. The driver sat at the front right of the hull, with a hull machine gunner to the left, while the commander occupied the turret alone and was responsible for commanding the tank, aiming, loading, and firing the main gun. This arrangement placed a heavy burden on the commander and significantly reduced combat efficiency. Internal communication was basic, often relying on hand signals or physical contact, and early versions lacked radios altogether.
Armament consisted of a 37 mm gun, initially the Type 94 and later the improved Type 97, mounted in a small manually traversed turret. This weapon was effective against infantry positions and lightly armoured vehicles and was adequate against opponents encountered in the 1930s. Secondary armament included two 7.7 mm Type 97 machine guns, one mounted in the hull and another fitted to the turret. While accurate and reasonably reliable, the 37 mm gun proved ineffective against Allied tanks later in the war, struggling to penetrate even light armour.
Protection was minimal, with armour thickness ranging from about 6 to 12 mm. This was enough to stop small-arms fire and shell splinters but offered little resistance to anti-tank rifles, heavy machine guns, or artillery. In the Pacific, even infantry weapons such as the American .50 calibre machine gun could penetrate the armour, making the tank extremely vulnerable in direct engagements.
Power came from an air-cooled Mitsubishi diesel engine producing roughly 120 horsepower. This gave a top road speed of around 45 kilometres per hour and a respectable operational range for a light tank. The diesel engine proved well suited to tropical climates, reducing fire risk and performing more reliably in heat and humidity than petrol engines. Its suspension, though simple, allowed it to negotiate jungle tracks, beaches, and rough ground reasonably well.
Combat service was extensive, with deployments in China, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and many Pacific islands including Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Okinawa. Early successes, particularly in Malaya and the Philippines, were achieved against poorly equipped forces and lightly armoured opponents. However, once Allied tanks such as the M3 Stuart and M4 Sherman appeared in greater numbers, the vehicle’s weaknesses became obvious. It was outgunned, out-armoured, and often destroyed before it could engage effectively.
One particularly notable aspect of its service was how long it remained in frontline use despite being obsolete. Japanese armoured doctrine viewed tanks primarily as infantry support weapons, and industrial limitations prevented rapid development of effective replacements. As a result, many were retained until the end of the war, with some even being buried as static defensive positions during the final island battles.
