18th April
The first phase of the Battle of Pork Chop Hill took place between 16 and ended on 18 April 1953 during the closing months of the Korean War, at a time when negotiations were ongoing but heavy fighting continued across the front. The hill, located in the central sector of Korea near the 38th parallel, was held by United Nations forces and faced positions occupied by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. Although small and of limited strategic depth, it provided observation over surrounding terrain and became a focal point for combat driven as much by morale and political signaling as by tactical necessity.
On the United Nations side, the forces engaged in the battle were primarily from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Arthur Trudeau. The defense of Pork Chop Hill itself was carried out mainly by elements of the 31st Infantry Regiment, particularly the 1st Battalion, along with supporting units rotated in as reinforcements. The companies most directly involved included Companies E and K, reinforced during the fighting by additional infantry elements and heavy weapons teams. In total, the number of U.S. troops committed over the course of the battle is estimated at roughly 1,200 to 1,500 men, though not all were engaged at the same time due to rotations, casualties, and reinforcements. Supporting them were artillery units from the division, including 105mm and 155mm batteries, as well as limited air support during daylight hours.
Opposing them were Chinese forces from the People’s Volunteer Army, likely drawn from elements of the 67th Division of the 23rd Army, under the broader command of Deng Hua, who was one of the senior commanders directing Chinese operations in Korea at the time. Local tactical control would have been exercised by regimental and battalion commanders whose names are less clearly recorded in widely available sources. The Chinese committed significantly larger numbers to the assault, with estimates ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 troops involved in repeated waves of attacks over the three-day battle. Their forces were organized into assault companies supported by mortars, heavy machine guns, and extensive pre-attack artillery barrages.
The battle began on the night of 16 April with a sudden and heavy Chinese assault. After a preparatory bombardment that severed communication lines and damaged defensive positions, Chinese infantry advanced in waves toward the hill. Their tactics relied on massed infantry attacks designed to overwhelm defenders through sheer numbers and persistence. Bugles and whistles were sometimes used to coordinate movements in the darkness, adding to the confusion experienced by the defending troops.
The American defenders, though initially under severe pressure, quickly organized their response. Small units held defensive positions in trenches and bunkers, engaging the advancing Chinese with rifle fire, machine guns, and grenades. The terrain of Pork Chop Hill made the fighting especially chaotic. Its slopes were steep and broken, and as artillery shells churned the ground, it became a maze of craters and shattered fortifications. Visibility was limited, particularly at night, and units often became isolated, fighting independently with little knowledge of the overall situation.
Throughout 17 April, the battle intensified. Chinese forces managed to gain temporary footholds on parts of the hill, particularly along the forward slopes and trench lines. United Nations forces responded with counterattacks, sending in reinforcements from reserve units within the 31st Infantry Regiment. These counterattacks were often conducted under heavy fire and resulted in close-quarters combat that included hand grenades and bayonets. Control of specific sections of the hill shifted multiple times during the fighting.
Artillery support proved decisive for the United Nations forces. Batteries from the 7th Infantry Division fired continuously, delivering defensive barrages that broke up Chinese assaults and supported counterattacks. At times, the volume of fire was so great that it effectively isolated the hill, preventing large-scale reinforcement by Chinese units once their initial assault waves had been committed. Air strikes during daylight hours targeted Chinese assembly areas and supply routes, further complicating their ability to sustain the attack.
By the early hours of 18 April, the momentum of the Chinese assault began to falter. Although they had committed large numbers of troops and inflicted significant casualties, they faced mounting losses themselves. The difficulty of coordinating attacks under constant artillery fire, combined with the resilience of the defenders, reduced the effectiveness of further assaults. United Nations forces, reinforced and supported by sustained firepower, were able to stabilize their positions and push back remaining enemy troops from key parts of the hill.
On 18 April 1953, the first battle effectively ended as Chinese forces withdrew from their most aggressive positions and ceased large-scale attacks on Pork Chop Hill. The United Nations retained control of the outpost, though it had been devastated by days of intense combat. Trenches and bunkers were destroyed, the ground was heavily cratered, and the hill was littered with the dead and wounded from both sides.
Casualties reflected the severity of the fighting. United Nations forces suffered several hundred casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, while Chinese losses were estimated to be significantly higher, likely exceeding a thousand due to repeated frontal assaults against entrenched positions supported by artillery. These figures, while approximate, illustrate the costly nature of the engagement.
The first Battle of Pork Chop Hill demonstrated the brutal stalemate that characterized the later stages of the Korean War. Despite the limited strategic value of the hill, both sides committed substantial forces in an effort to assert dominance and influence the broader context of the war and its negotiations. The determination of the defending units of the 31st Infantry Regiment, supported by divisional artillery and command under Arthur Trudeau, enabled the United Nations to hold the position against numerically superior forces directed under the wider Chinese command structure of Deng Hua.
Although the fighting ended on 18 April with the hill still in United Nations hands, the struggle over Pork Chop Hill was not concluded. The same ground would again become the scene of intense combat in July 1953, highlighting how certain positions in the Korean War took on symbolic importance far beyond their immediate tactical value.
